Redetext zum Vortrag
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(übersetzt aus dem Russischen von Dr. Elisabeth HERESCH)
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen!

The subject of my presentation is "New Trends in the Development of International Relations." I begin with the world order as it now stands. This was not difficult to describe during the time of the cold war. Its primary feature was the existence of two superpowers opposing one another. One of them—the Soviet Union—has ceased to exist. The other—the United States—remained the strongest country in both economic and military terms as well as with regard to its political influence. A whole constellation of politicians and political analysts believed that this would lead to a unipolar world order. Recall that Hitler's Germany also laid claim to a unipolar world order based on geopolitical considerations. Motivated by ideology, the Soviet Union did likewise in an earlier phase of its existence as people in Moscow hoped for a worldwide revolution. Considered historically, however, a unipolar concept of world order never became reality. Nor did it this time as the United States laid claim to the creation of such an order after the end of the cold war.

A series of obstacles stood in the way of this suggestion. First, the prerequisites for the qualitative—and I stress, qualitative, not quantitative—characteristic of a superpower remaining intact vanished after the end of the cold war. During the cold war, there were the two super powers not because of their abundance of power as such, but due to the fact that they had united other states around them, guaranteed their safety, and dictated their behavior. This function vanished with the cold war. Unfortunately, this was not immediately noticed in Washington. Second, the progress of different countries' unequal development can be observed. China has become a phenomenon representing the second largest economic power. India, the nations of the European Union, and a few in Latin America are developing rapidly. Russia is also among these despite numerous problems.

The policy of American president Bush Jr. has made abundantly clear the extent to which the quest for a unipolar world order proved futile. American neoconservatives defined the doctrine of unilateralism under his leadership. According to this doctrine, the USA itself can and should determine which states represent a threat to international security and arbitrarily apply force against them. The American military operation in Iraq, conducted without a resolution of the UN Security Council, is one example of this. The disastrous consequences of this deployment are well known today. As it turns out, there were neither nuclear weapons in Iraq nor were any being produced. Instead, intervention in the country brought permanent chaos, countless victims among the civilian population, and a sectarian war between Sunnis and Shiites. Furthermore, it has brought the danger of Iraq's disintegration, the strengthening of the Islamic terrorist organization Al Qaeda's positions in its territory, and the fact that Iran has become a regional power after the Iraqi counter-weight had been destroyed.

The global economic crisis is a further indication that there can be no unipolar world order. It has not only exposed the instability of the financial system, which is directed from one center—the United States, but has also demonstrated that this in no way meets the current world economy's requirements.

Transfer of power to President Obama signifies the rejection of many of the ideas of his predecessor, Bush Jr. Obama freed himself from the immediate influence of the "neocons." Without explicitly emphasizing it, he turned away from the doctrine of unilateralism. Measures were implemented to strengthen relationships with allies united under NATO. Under Obama, Washington is also showing itself inclined to build bridges to those states on which much depends in current international relations. It was primarily a matter of Russian-American relations, which need, as Vice President Biden called it, "reloading."

It must be clearly stated that the process of improving relations between the two antagonistically opposed cold-war states, the USA and the Russian Federation, which had become the Soviet Union's successor, has become a new feature of the present international situation. The idea is widespread in the West that improvement of Russian-American relations has only become possible under president, Dmitry Medvedev. Adherents of such views attempt to contrast Medvedev to Putin. Differences clearly exist between the two in some respects, but both Russian leaders consistently assume the necessity of improving relations between Russia and the USA. However, even the possibility of this only became actual when President Obama took office in the White House.

There are quite tangible achievements along this path. Among these are conclusion of the SNW-3 agreement, which severely reduced the number of each power's nuclear warheads and rocket launchers. That is a success to be taken seriously. Problems that can be momentous for Russian-American relations certainly remain in the military area. The main problem is the intent of influential circles in the U.S. not to allow themselves to be prevented from developing their own rocket defense system or MDS. Moscow sees an anti-Russian attitude in this intent. It is hard not to concur with such a conclusion when the U.S., as they say, wants to build its MDS system in Europe directly on Russia's borders to intercept Iranian missiles. Russia has offered a counter-proposal—namely the creation of a common MDS rocket shield together with
NATO, possibly on a Russian-American basis. There are ongoing negotiations and much depends on their success.

I want you to get a correct idea about the Russian position. The creation of an independent or NATO-MDS missile shield without Russian involvement would, in our military's opinion, make it impossible to deviate from the course of mutual restraint. At the same time, Russia obviously cannot join the missile-defense-systems arms race. It lacks the means and it would have to depart from urgently-needed modernization of the economy. So the only way out remains strengthening strategic offensive systems that are able to evade the MDS shield developed by the opponent. This is not our choice in any case. However, we do hope that this will not be necessary.

I don't want to idealize the American president, but Obama's loss of the election for a second term could lead to undesirable consequences for US-Russian relations. So an uncertainty factor for relations between Russia and the USA still presents itself. But I would like to say again that positive progress is currently underway.

I've placed special emphasis on Russian-American relations. But that doesn't imply that the course in the direction of rapprochement with the European Union takes second place for Russia. Rapprochement has recently occurred not only in the economic, but also in the political area. Concern about this is present on both sides. Russia's need for such a rapprochement has primarily well-defined economic reasons. I'm going to take a closer look at the current state of Russia's economic development in this connection.

Our country's most important task is probably review of the economic model that has formed during the changeover from a managed, planned economy to market-based economic tracks. Many had their eyes opened for this model on the occasion of the 2008 global economic crisis. Russia, which was dragged into this crisis, was a country in which 40 percent of GDP depended on raw-materials export, while corporate indebtedness vis-à-vis foreign countries reached 500 bn US dollars. All that was "long-term" money that the economy received in the form of credits, which in turn came from foreign countries. Nor could it be otherwise, since the Russian banking system was completely uncompetitive vis-à-vis those in foreign countries—in regard to guaranteeing long-term credits as well as with interest rates. The amount of 500 bn dollars corresponded to our country's gold reserves at that time.

Chronic lack of investment was one of the economic model's most negative consequences before the crisis. Its entire share in terms of GDP comprises less than 20 percent. As is well known, trade rivalry for investments, for technology, and for information is the foundation of economic competition in 21st century. And we've lost this battle despite the fact that the overall investment climate picture in Russia is favorable. We have low foreign debt and a relatively good financial situation. Our legislation, like civil society, meets modern international standards in principle. Our income tax, land tax, and property tax are low; we have a qualified and relatively cheap supply of engineers and workers, and an abundance of natural resources. And finally, return (repatriation) of capital and profits is guaranteed by law here.

But a series of problems attenuates the enumerated advantages' value. One of these is probably the high degree of corruption as reflected in particular by favoritism of state officials, who "protect" those companies that are in competition for potential investors.

In Russia, we now know about the economic situation's shortcomings and are working to improve it. Among other things, this includes tax privileges especially for investors who invest capital in high tech sectors.

It must be said that the majority of Russian economists say: there must be no return to the policy before the crisis. This should also not be because even under the precondition of high prices for exported raw materials, this model in fact leads to a rapid increase in GDP and lifts the population's living standards, but does not address the tasks of structural change, technical and technological renewal of the Russian economy, and its guidance onto innovative paths. And this is exactly this urgent task we face today.

I don't want to deny that the question of modernizing the Russian economy will be discussed and debated in our country in one form or another. Some government officials point out that the main oil importers are gradually emerging from the recession and are keeping the prices of crude oil at a fairly high level. In their opinion, continuing the course of priority assistance to big raw-material companies revives the favorable situation before the crisis, which did indeed promote GDP growth and prosperity of the population in Russia.

How will these discussions turn out? You can be sure that the reluctance of those who would not mind returning to the pre-crisis model of the Russian economy is examined with increasingly critical scrutiny. For the first time, Vladimir Putin aired the need for a new economic model for Russia in presenting measures against the crisis. And Dmitry Medvedev further implemented the concept of renewal as a motto for Russia's modernization.
It's quite natural that cooperation in foreign trade is conceded a special significance in Moscow under these conditions, and now also political relations not just with individual EU countries, but also with the EU as a whole. European countries play a truly important role in Russian goods traffic. They have significant share of foreign investment in the Russian economy. They are the main market for the petroleum and natural gas that Russia exports. The EU's member nations have developed into a major source of imported modern equipment in the field of high technology. However, as already mentioned, Russia's desire to expand relations with the EU itself is being appended to its bilateral relations with European nations. What's behind this? Above all, the insight that the integration of European states into the European Union, with all the problems coming to light, is an irreversible process. At the same time, however, something else is becoming clear: given this process' irreversibility, given the fact that national structures became conspicuous, did and does not lead to a loss of sovereignty of the Union's countries. The USSR is well known—to put it bluntly—to have taken a suspicious attitude towards the entrance of Western European countries into the integration process of incorporation with the Union, believing that this would damage bilateral relations with these countries. Now the situation has fundamentally changed. Especially given the example of our relations with Finland and Austria, we have come to the conclusion that entry of both countries into the EU is no obstacle to the development of our relations with them. The Declaration on Partnership for modernizing the Russian economy that originated at the EU-Russia Summit has great significance in this connection. The declaration is currently elaborated bilaterally in detail with some EU countries. Russia has already signed the documents.

This raises the hypothetical question: Can't Russia become an EU member? I don't believe that the answer to this question depends primarily on Russia. I doubt even more that Russia would decline becoming an EU member if asked. But such a case is hard to imagine at the present time. Significantly more likely is the gradual move towards forming a common economic space between Russia and the EU. One step in this direction is no doubt negotiations over visa-free traffic between Russia and countries that have signed the Maastricht Treaty. A further step is the expansion of a free-trade zone.

Now I would like to discuss an important development that has been in progress very recently at the international level. I'm talking about events in the Middle East and North Africa. It began with a wave of anti-government demonstrations in Tunis, was then continued in Egypt and Libya, and expanded as far as Yemen and toward Bahrain. The wave has swept away the ruling regimes in Tunisia and Egypt; both countries' presidents have resigned. In Libya, the clashes resulted in civil war and in Bahrain in the struggle between the population's Shiite majority and the Sunni leadership. Despite obvious differences between the events, there is undoubtedly something in common, which came as a surprise to many observers. Most politicians and political analysts were of the opinion that revolutions in the Arab world had ended during the anticolonial phase, and that in the postcolonial era, change of the forces in power would only come about through a coup at the top. But a revolutionary storm erupted from broad masses of the population, especially the young, and now no longer against foreign rulers, but against its "own" corrupt authoritarian regimes.

The influence of modernization on Arab countries was also underestimated. The very first revolutionary outbreak took place in the most developed Arab countries—Tunisia and Egypt. Demonstrators were rounded up using the Internet and mobile phones. In Egypt, the youth organization "6th of April Movement" was at the core of such an assembly, and 70,000 people came to this organization in the name of their club, which arose via the Internet. Something else is also characteristic: in neither Tunisia nor in Egypt did the demonstrators use Islamic flags and slogans. In these pioneering countries of revolutionary events in the Arab world, Islamists played and play no autonomous—let alone decisive—role in the burgeoning revolutionary movement. That doesn't mean you can write off Islamist forces in general, only that the reality forces one to doubt the correctness of the conclusion that any deviation from authoritarian regimes in the Arab world is a victory for Islamic extremism. Moreover—well aware of such assumptions in the West—Muammar Gaddafi tirelessly repeats that the people rising up against him in Libya were organized by "Al Qaeda." Even Mubarak, the president of Egypt, tried to intimidate the U.S. and Western Europe with the Islamic threat before his fall, as he sought support to preserve his power.

All that is far from meaning that the danger posed by Islamic extremism has vanished. But at the same time, all that requires a sophisticated approach with respect to Islamic organizations and with respect to countries that preach Islam. You have to differentiate between extreme and moderate Islam.

Finally, I would like to say a few words about Russian - Austrian economic relations. They're developing quite satisfactorily. The crisis has certainly lead to a reduction in goods traffic between the two countries. But the situation is already back to the process of improvement. Russian imports from Austria are growing particularly rapidly. The increase was nearly 20% in 2010. Austria is ranked 12th on a list of investor countries among investors in Russia. More than 1,200 Austrian companies are active on the Russian market. We very much appreciate the fact that the Österreichische Kontrollbank has lifted restrictions on the
maximum amount of state export insurance and on Austrian companies’ investments to Russia and has extended the guarantees’ period of validity. That no doubt contributes to Austrian companies’ investment activity in Russia’s direction.

The picture looks even more impressive if you add the more stable character of political contacts and consultations between the two countries at a high level and the deepening relations between the parliaments.